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abstract: Is it possible to justify requiring that I respond adequately 
to the other’s vulnerability? I contend that insofar as I value my own 
personal identity it is consistent to respond adequately to the vulnerabil-
ity of the other. Part one provides a break down of vulnerability in terms 
of its fundamental indeterminacy. Part two illustrates how the ability to 
respond either adequately or inadequately to the other’s vulnerability is 
implied by the fundamental co-constitution of personal identity. I under-
stand myself as a self only insofar as I stand in relation to other selves that 
see me as a self. If the relationship between recognition and identity also 
holds for the other, my response to her vulnerability founds her identity 
as well. In part three the relationship developed in part two is employed 
to justify the obligation to respond adequately to the vulnerable other. If 
I value my own personal identity, then I require an adequate response 
from others, because that response plays an integral role in the foundation 
of my personal identity. The other cannot respond adequately to my 
vulnerability unless her own identity is assured. Only if I respond ade-
quately to the vulnerability of the other will she be in a position to assure 
my identity. Therefore, I ought to respond adequately to the vulnerabil-
ity of others if for no other reason than it puts the other in a position 
where she can assure the personal identity that I value.
Keywords: vulnerability, personal identity, indeterminacy, relational 
autonomy, feminist ethics, Emmanuel Levinas.
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Is it possible to justify requiring that I respond adequately to the 
other’s vulnerability? By an adequate response to vulnerability I mean a 
response to the vulnerable other that respects her vulnerability and sup-
ports her personal identity. I contend that insofar as I value my personal 
identity it is consistent to respond adequately to the vulnerability of the 
other. Part one provides a break down vulnerability in terms of its fun-
damental indeterminacy. Part two illustrates how the ability to respond 
either adequately or inadequately to the other’s vulnerability is implied 
by the fundamental co-constitution of personal identity. I am vulnerable 
to the other because the other has the ability to respond to me either 
adequately or inadequately, and I can never know how the other is going 
to react. The other is vulnerable to me for the same reason. It is my 
vulnerability, and the other’s response to my vulnerability that either 
supports my identity or disrupts it. This kind of vulnerability is funda-
mental because the response of the other makes my identity possible. 
That is to say, I understand myself as a self only insofar as I stand in rela-
tion to other selves that see me as a self. If the relationship between rec-
ognition and identity also holds for the other, my response to her vulner-
ability founds her identity as well. In part three the relationship developed 
in part two is employed to justify the obligation to respond adequately 
to the vulnerable other. If I value my own personal identity, then I require 
an adequate response from others, because that response plays an integral 
role in the foundation of our identities. The other cannot respond ade-
quately to my vulnerability unless her own personal identity is assured. 
Only if I respond adequately to the vulnerability of the other will she be 
in a position to assure my identity. Therefore, we ought to respond ad-
equately to the vulnerability of others if for no other reason than it puts 
the other in a position where she can assure my personal identity.
Part oNe: vulNeraBIlIty aND the aBIlIty to resPoND:  
a relatIoN fouNDeD oN INDeterMINacy
All human beings are subject to ontological vulnerability. It is “a 
fundamental part of the human condition, (1) and I will demonstrate that 
at the heart of vulnerability is indeterminacy. Vulnerability is always 
vulnerability to that which I know not what. The fundamental indeter-
minacy of vulnerability is only resolved once I am undergoing a specific 
transgression. Vulnerability is transgressed when a painful or negative 
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happenstance that I am vulnerable to comes to pass. Once vulnerability 
has been fully determined, I am no longer vulnerable to that specific harm. 
I may be vulnerable to another harm, or the continuation or repetition 
of the harm that I am currently undergoing, but while my vulnerability 
is being transgressed I am no longer vulnerable to that particular transgres-
sion as the worst has already come to be. Once vulnerability has been 
transgressed it ceases to be vulnerability because it loses its fundamental 
indeterminacy in the specificity of transgression.
Consider the following example. Stacy has a body that is generally 
vulnerable to injury, death and decay. Her body is more specifically vul- 
nerable to anaphylactic shock if exposed to peanuts. In the general case 
Stacy is vulnerable to any number of negative interferences with her 
body. However, when a car hits Stacy she is no longer vulnerable to 
being hit by this car. Rather, that particular vulnerability has been made 
determinate in its transgression. As a result, Stacy remains vulnerable to 
a wide variety of harms that have not been made determinate, being hit 
by another car for instance, or losing her shoes on the way to the hos-
pital, but once vulnerability has been made determinate it is no longer 
vulnerability.
This is also the case with Stacy’s more specific vulnerability. While a 
peanut allergy is much more determinate than general bodily vulnerabil-
ity, it is still fundamentally indeterminate. While Stacy knows that peanuts 
will trigger her anaphylaxis, she does not know when or where or under 
what circumstances she might come into contact with peanuts. In this 
case it is not simply the timing of the event that is indeterminate, but 
Stacy’s very vulnerability itself is a vulnerability only because it is inde-
terminate. While Stacy knows the direct trigger that leads to a transgres-
sion of her vulnerability, namely contact with peanuts, she is only vulner-
able to this trigger insofar as it is fundamentally indeterminate how the 
trigger will appear for her. For instance, if it was the case that Stacy had 
a peanut allergy, but the only way for her to come into contact with 
peanuts is to enter one particular easily avoidable institution, and there 
is no chance of her running into peanuts in any other circumstance, it 
would be inaccurate to say she is vulnerable to peanuts. Rather we might 
say that she could be vulnerable to peanuts if circumstances were to change. 
It is my contention that if we had full access to the specific causes of 
vulnerability and perfect knowledge of how to avoid them then we could 
no longer claim to be vulnerable to those threats. It is the fundamental 
indeterminacy of never knowing exactly when or where or how one’s 
Ramon Llull Journal_07.indd   59 30/05/16   11:56
60 raMoN llull JourNal of aPPlIeD ethIcs 2016. Issue 7 PP. 57-70
vulnerability can be transgressed that is at the heart of any definition 
of vulnerability.
Three factors contribute substantially to the fundamental indetermi-
nacy of vulnerability. These include the endlessly vulnerable body, the 
unknowable and uncontrollable other, and the indeterminacy of my own 
capacity for resilience. The most straightforward way that indeterminate 
ontological vulnerability manifests itself is through the prone body, “for 
instance, my body is vulnerable to death, injury and decay.” (2) I am 
subject to the unspecified but inevitable decaying of my body. I am also 
prone to an array of possible injuries, or even death, as a result of my 
vulnerability to my environment.
A further instantiation of the characteristic indeterminacy of vulner-
ability is the indeterminacy of one’s own resilience. Even if someone were 
to know exactly what she was vulnerable to and the precise manner in 
which she might come into contact with that to which she is vulnerable, 
she can still never be certain of her own reaction to a transgression. Re-
silience here is meant to indicate “the capacity of a system to absorb 
disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain 
essentially the same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks.” (3) 
While an individual may have a sense of her own ability to cope with a 
transgression of her vulnerability, she cannot know for certain if she can 
maintain functionality or her sense of personal identity on the face of a 
major transgression of her vulnerability. It may be possible that an indi-
vidual has a high expectation of her ability to cope with a particular 
transgression, but when that transgression comes to pass and she is not 
resilient enough to cope, or the other way around. This lack of certainty 
regarding one’s own resilience further illustrates the indeterminacy of 
vulnerability. Even in the case that a vulnerable individual has perfect 
knowledge of the risks associated with her vulnerability, she still cannot 
know her own ability to cope with a transgression, and thus her vulner-
ability remains inherently indeterminate.
The fundamental indeterminacy that is at the heart of vulnerability is 
also at the heart of our interactions with others. In the introduction to 
Vulnerability Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds claim, “as embodied social 
beings we are both vulnerable to the actions of others, and dependent 
upon the care and support of other people.” (4) This suggests two ways 
in which I am vulnerable to the other. The first is my vulnerability as an 
embodied being and the second is my vulnerability as a social being. In 
the case of my embodied vulnerability to the indeterminate other, given 
Ramon Llull Journal_07.indd   60 30/05/16   11:56
61kavaNaGh
JustIfyING aN aDeQuate resPoNse to the vulNeraBle other
that my body is “fragile…[and] susceptible to wounding and to suffering” 
(5) in ways that I can hypothesize about, but never predict with cer-
tainty and given my contact with the other who is both powerful and 
unpredictable, I cannot know all of the things that she might do or fail 
to do that could hurt my vulnerable body. What defines ontological 
vulnerability is that to be human is to be open to the threatening unknown 
that Levinas describes as “an exposedness to the other” (6) and the other 
is inaccessible to me. Vulnerability is indeterminate because I am vulner-
able to the other and the other is unknowable
It is not simply the case that I am vulnerable to one another in terms 
of my embodied nature; I am also vulnerable to the other as a result of 
my status as a social being. For instance, as a social being I am vulnerable 
to the denial of my personal identity by being “excluded by others.” (7) 
Insofar as people are inherently vulnerable, and inherently relational 
relating to others, “exposes us to the actions of others and may elicit a 
wide range of responses from them… this ambiguity is an ineradicable 
feature of the self-other relation.” (8) In each case the vulnerable person 
has no way of predicting how the other will respond, and there is always 
the possibility that the response will be harmful or inadequate. Thus, 
whenever I relate with another person all of our interactions are charac-
terized by the fundamental indeterminacy that is at the heart of vulne-
rability.
For instance, when I wave hello to someone I solicit a response, and 
I have a specific expectation of what that response will be. I wave to Joan 
with the expectation that she will wave back to me. However, in relating 
with Joan I am putting myself in a vulnerable position because I do not 
know what her response will be, and it could very well be an unex-
pected or harmful response. Perhaps Joan will not wave back at me, 
maybe she will rush me with a hug that makes me uncomfortable, maybe 
she will punch me in the face, maybe she will not respond leaving me 
feeling like a fool. Here we can see the demand of vulnerability in ac-
tion. Vulnerability demands a response such that even a non-response 
is a kind of response. In any case, my relation with the other leaves me 
vulnerable to her response to me. Vulnerability is inherently indeter-
minate. The body is endlessly vulnerable, resilience is unpredictable and 
the other is unknowable. As we will see this relationship of indetermi-
nate vulnerability with the radical alterity of the other co-constitutes 
personal identity.
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Part 2: relatING vulNeraBIlIty aND PersoNal IDeNtIty
It is the relationship with others that makes possible my personal 
identity. In Otherwise than Being Levinas argues, “identity here takes 
form not by self-confirmation, but, as a signification of the one-for-the-
other.” (9) My understanding of the continuity of myself is only possible 
as a result of the other who looks at me. If I had no concept of an other 
who sees me, then I would have no reason to ever reflect on the continu-
ity of my experience. Rather, I would go on directly experiencing with 
no trigger to reflect on my personal identity in terms of an enduring, 
holistic self. Peperzak comments that for Levinas “I am a human body 
of flesh and blood, simultaneously independent and pertaining to the 
Other.” (10) On this account the response of the other to my body founds 
my personal identity.
In her article on the narrative constitution of identity Somers argues, 
“all of us come to be who we are (however ephemeral, multiple, and 
changing) by being located or locating ourselves (usually unconsciously) 
in social narratives rarely of our own making.” (11) On this account 
personal identity is co-constituted through the participation of others that 
have produced the narratives that make up personal identity. As a result 
of being “embedded within and constituted by relationships and relation-
ality” (12) the relationship between the response of the other and the 
constitution of personal identity functions such that any interaction be-
tween self and other demands a response.
The co-constitution of autonomy in relation with the other is illustra-
tive of the kind of indeterminate and vulnerable relationship that co-
constitutes identity as a whole according to both Somers and Levinas. In 
her discussion of autonomy in the first chapter of Vulnerability, Macken-
zie claims that autonomy has a status component that is critical to its 
constitution. That is to say, a person cannot be autonomous without 
others confirming that autonomous status. She argues, “because this 
status dimension of autonomy is constituted intersubjectively in social 
relations of recognition, it is vulnerable to other’s failures, or refusals to 
grant us appropriate recognition in a range of different spheres.” (13) In 
order to be an autonomous individual, one must be considered an au-
tonomous individual by others in the community. For instance, if a 
woman considers herself to be an autonomous individual but her com-
munity does not, she will be restricted from engaging in the kinds of 
actions that those who are considered autonomous in her community are 
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able to engage in. In a community where riding a bike is an important 
option, if women are prevented from riding bikes then their autonomy 
is thwarted.
Even more insidious than such attacks on practical freedom is the way 
that refusing to recognize an individual’s autonomy restricts a person 
from developing autonomy at all. Without recognition as an autonomous 
individual from others, it is not possible for a person to develop any 
semblance of autonomy at all. For instance, consider the survivalist who 
is intent on making herself perfectly self-sufficient and autonomous. She 
grows her own food, chops her own firewood and crafts her own tools. 
Even in this case the survivalist will require a vast support network that 
allows her to live as she does. If she is chopping wood for a fireplace she 
may have needed others to build that fireplace. In any case she needed 
the person who discovered fire, and the person who taught her how to 
build a fire, and the knowledge of woodcutting techniques that also comes 
from others. As a condition of the possibility of autonomy a network of 
material and immaterial resources that are supplied by other people is 
required. Furthermore, the survivalist requires that her choice of how to 
live be respected by others. If people that are trying to convince her to 
live a different kind of lifestyle are constantly attacking her, then she will 
be unable to live an autonomous life. In other words, without recognition 
as autonomous the survivalist cannot be autonomous. Thus, if one is only 
recognized as a non-autonomous being then one is only able to be a non-
autonomous being.
The status dimension of autonomy is not the only aspect of personal 
identity that is “constituted intersubjectively in social relations of recog-
nition.” (14) It is the case that a foundational component of a person’s 
identity as a whole is constituted in terms of social relations of recognition. 
The manner in which others respond to me makes me who I am. Mac-
kenzie sums up a relational view of identity constitution when she writes, 
“the internalization of non– or misrecognition can corrode the self-affec-
tive attitudes of self-respect, self-trust and self-esteem that underpin one’s 
sense of oneself as an autonomous agent.” (15) Proper recognition, that 
is an adequate response to my vulnerability, does more than found my 
sense of myself as an autonomous agent; it underpins my sense of myself 
entirely.
Given the relationality of personal identity, the vulnerability of the 
other absolutely requires a response. Levinas claims, “subjectivity is… a 
vulnerability and a responsibility in the proximity of the others, the one-
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for-the-others.” (16) Any response to the other’s vulnerability, even no 
response, provides a response to the vulnerable other because it is in my 
response (or non response) to the vulnerable other that my personal 
identity becomes determinate. Consider the following example, I see 
others as indeterminate, vulnerable, enduring personal identities, and as 
a result I am able to reflect on myself in terms of enduring personal iden-
tity. When I am faced with a vulnerable and enduring personal identity 
my response affects the way I understand my own personal identity. My 
response to the vulnerable other affects my understanding of my per-
sonal identity. My response to the vulnerabilities of others will be incor-
porated into the narrative of personal identity that I have for myself. For 
example, I can coherently maintain my personal identity as the kind of 
person who helps someone in need, only if when faced with that vulner-
ability I respond with compassion. Thus, every time I am faced with any 
vulnerable other a response is solicited and a response is given, and this 
interaction plays a foundational role in my personal identity.
Part 3: a JustIfIcatIoN for aDeQuately resPoNDING  
to the vulNeraBIlIty of the other
I began by showing that what is at the heart of vulnerability is funda-
mental indeterminacy. I am vulnerable to that which I know not what, 
and that which I know not what could be harmful or inadequate to my 
needs. Furthermore, my own resiliency to transgression is indeterminate 
until I have been transgressed. As a result I cannot be sure of all of the 
ways in which I am vulnerable and the degree to which I am vulnerable. 
I went on to show that my vulnerability in the face of the other is the 
result of two things, the other’s fundamental indeterminacy, and the 
demand for a response that flows from the relational co-constitution of 
personal identity. Given a relational account of personal identity the 
other’s response to my vulnerability founds my personal identity. If my 
personal identity is secured by the other, and the personal identity of the 
other can be secured by me, and the other can only secure my personal 
identity if she has a secure identity herself, then it makes sense for me to 
support the other’s identity through an adequate response to her vulner-
ability so that she is capable of supporting my personal identity. If we 
value our identities we require an adequate response from others, and 
they require an adequate response from us.
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Just as my personal identity is co-constituted by the others that respond 
to me, I also play the role as the other who responds to a given self. As 
such it is not simply the case that the other constitutes my personal iden-
tity. I also constitute the other’s personal identity. In my introduction to 
this project I began with the question, what justifies the requirement of 
an adequate response to the vulnerability of the other? And it is here that 
the justification for an adequate response becomes clear.
premise 1: We value our own personal identities.
premise 2: If we value our own personal identities then we require re-
sponsibility from others.
premise 3: The other cannot respond adequately to my vulnerability 
unless her own personal identity is assured.
premise 4: If I respond adequately to the other then her own personal 
identity will be assured.
conclusion: I ought to respond adequately to the vulnerability of others 
if for no other reason than it puts them in a position to be able to ensure 
my personal identity.
I take premise one, that we value our own personal identities, to be 
fairly self-evident. Particularly in our modern, western culture maintain-
ing a sense of oneself as a coherent identifiable individual, expressing that 
sense, and having those around you confirm your sense of personal 
identity holds incredible weight. People travel to find themselves. They 
seek out therapists who can help them to get a better sense of their per-
sonal identities. They express themselves in art and fashion, and surround 
themselves with people who take them up as they wish to be taken up. 
However, a critic might argue for the possibility of destroying one’s 
personal identity and the potential of a sort of freedom that comes with 
that. In response to this objection I would like to suggest a division between 
the notion of “no-self” that crops up in many Eastern philosophical and 
spiritual traditions including Taoism and Buddhism, and an identity that 
has been shattered as a result of inadequate or harmful responses from 
others. In his article on selfhood and identity in Confucianism, Taoism, 
Buddhism and Hinduism David Ho introduces the reader to the notion 
of no-self through the master Chang-tzu, “In Chang-tzu, regarded as a 
mystic of unmatched brilliance in China, we find an explicit negation of 
the centrality of the self: ‘The perfect man has no self; the spiritual man 
has no achievement; the true sage has no name’.” (17) This positive ver-
sion of shedding personal identity is quite different than a personal iden-
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tity that has been shattered as a result of inadequate or harmful responses 
from others. Selflessness in this sense is not achieved by having others 
shatter your identity, but by “developing an attitude that leads to accept-
ance of both life and death.” (18). That is to say, the person seeking 
selflessness takes action to rid themselves of their sense of personal iden-
tity. On the other hand, those who do not work to disrupt their own 
identities, but have their identities shattered by others, are no longer able 
to freely choose to rid themselves of their personal identities, nor can 
they respond to those others, all they can do is simply react. The differ-
ence between response and reaction will become clear in my defense of 
premise three.
I defend premise two part one and two of this article. I am vulnerable 
to the other because they represent a powerful fundamental indetermi-
nacy. I do not know how the other is going to respond to me, and they 
have the power to respond to me inadequately. Given that my identity 
is relationally co-constituted, an inadequate or harmful response has the 
power to potentially disrupt my sense of identity. The outcome of a 
potentially harmful or inadequate response will depend on both the re-
sponse itself, and the resilience of my identity in the face of a non-sup-
portive response. For instance, if I have a secure sense of my identity as 
an accomplished academic and a colleague treats me in a condescending 
way, this might have very little impact on my sense of personal identity 
because my identity is resilient. However, if I am just beginning my career 
as an academic and my sense of myself as an accomplished academic is 
not very resilient, then condescending behavior from a colleague might 
severely disrupt my identity. Therefore, if I value my personal identity, 
then it will often be the case that I require an adequate response from 
others in order to maintain it.
In premise three I claim that the other cannot appropriately respond 
to my vulnerability, and thus secure my personal identity, unless her 
own personal identity is secured. In order for the other to adequately 
respond to my vulnerability in a way that supports my identity she 
must be capable of responding. A person without a coherent identity 
is unable to respond adequately because someone who does not have 
the foundational support of secure identity of her own cannot support 
my identity.
Consider the following example: Stacy is delivering a talk at a confer-
ence. The audience of this conference consists of some people who have 
a secure sense of personal identity and some people who have an insecure 
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sense of personal identity. After her talk Stacy is approached by Re-
becca and Maka, they both thank her for her talk and tell her that she 
has done an excellent job. Over the course of the rest of the conference 
Stacy notices that Maka maintains a coherent personal identity through-
out the conference, she likes some papers and dislikes others. Maka 
changes her mind about some papers but only after being given compel-
ling reasons to do so. On the other hand Rebecca’s personal identity is 
much less coherent; she likes every paper when she is talking to the 
author, but when she is with a group that dislikes one of the papers she 
changes her mind. Rather than having opinions, ideas or even manner-
isms of her own she simply reflects those of whomever she happens to 
be with. When Stacy is considering her identity as an excellent writer 
and she reflects on the comments she received at the conference it is my 
contention that Maka’s comments adequately respond to Stacy’s vulner-
ability, and support her identity, while Rebecca’s comments do not. 
Rebecca’s incoherent identity means that she is not in a position to ad-
equately respond to Stacy’s vulnerability because Rebecca does not have 
a coherent identity to provide the foundation from which she can ade-
quately respond.
This is not to say that in order to adequately respond to the vulner-
ability of the other in a way that supports her personal identity in every 
case it is required that the other must agree with the way that the self 
conceives of her identity. Maka could choose not to support Stacy’s 
personal identity as an excellent writer and instead respond to her in a 
way that throws into question this component of Stacy’s identity. How-
ever, even this response is adequate because it still supports Stacy’s 
identity more generally. Maka could respond to Stacy’s identity in a way 
that offers Stacy a reinterpretation of her identity, but in order to rein-
terpret Stacy’s identity Maka must recognize and respond to Stacy’s 
identity as it stands. However, Rebecca’s disapproval of Stacy’s paper is 
just as inadequate a response to Stacy’s vulnerability as her acceptance 
of Stacy’s paper, because there is no meaningful foundation from which 
Rebecca can respond to Stacy, rather she simply reacts to Stacy. It is my 
contention that in order for the other to respond adequately to my 
vulnerability, and thus found my personal identity, she must have a 
reasonably secure personal identity as a condition of the possibility of 
having a meaningful response.
Premise four is simply the reverse of the relationship that I illustrate 
in premise two. As an other relating with a self that has a relational iden-
Ramon Llull Journal_07.indd   67 30/05/16   11:56
68 raMoN llull JourNal of aPPlIeD ethIcs 2016. Issue 7 PP. 57-70
tity, that self is vulnerable to my response. If I respond adequately to the 
other’s vulnerability I support her identity, just as she supports my iden-
tity when she responds adequately to my vulnerability.
Thus, it is my conclusion that I am justified in requiring an adequate 
response to the vulnerable other because this is the only way that I can 
protect my own personal identity. If I support the identity of the 
other, then the other can choose to support my identity. If I do not 
support the identity of the other then there is no possible way that the 
other can support my identity. Any secure personal identity is capable 
of responding adequately to the vulnerability of any other identity. But 
without a secure personal identity, which requires that support of 
other secure personal identities, it is not possible for an insecure per-
sonal identity to respond adequately to any other identity. My perso - 
nal identity is of value to me, so I ought to adequately respond to the 
vulnerable other.
Part one of this article presents and defends the fundamental indeter-
minacy of vulnerability. Part two illustrates the foundational relationship 
between responses to indeterminate vulnerability and personal identity. 
Finally, part three uses the relationship between indeterminate vulner-
ability and personal identity to provide a justification for why we are 
obligated to respond adequately to the vulnerable other. Namely, we 
ought to respond adequately to the vulnerability of others because as-
suring the other’s identity is the condition of the possibility of my own 
identity.
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